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Republic of Debtors: Bankruptcy in the Age of American Independence. By Bruce H.
Mann. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2002. Pp. viii, 344.
$29.95.
Republic of Debtors is a book about changing attitudes toward and legal treatment of
debtors in America from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the
nineteenth. The book concludes with the congressional passage in 1800 of the first United
States Bankruptcy Act and its subsequent repeal only three years later. It was not until 1841
that Congress again enacted, if only temporarily, a second Bankruptcy Act, and not until
1898 that it finally made bankruptcy a permanent feature of the law of the United States.
The thrust of Mann’s argument is that “[e]arlier in the [eighteenth] century, bankruptcy
relief was not so much controversial as unthinkable. By 1800 debtors and creditors alike
desired it” (p. 2). Bankruptcy relief offered debtors a discharge from their debts once they
had produced what property they still owned for distribution to their creditors. Mann argues
that at the beginning of the eighteenth century attitudes towards debt and debtors were still
largely based on a religious morality that viewed both as morally suspect. The idea that
debtors should ever be forgiven their debts was completely anathema. Mann is of the
historical school that views the early-eighteenth-century American economy as a species
of moral economy, one in which economic activity has not yet been liberated from the
constraints of traditional morality and religion. Debtors who were not able to meet their
obligations could be imprisoned by their creditors and in some cases held indefinitely. In
a number of colonies debtors who failed to repay debts could be indented to their creditors
and compelled to work off their debts. Above all, unlike England, there was no general
bankruptcy law under which debtors might, under certain circumstances, be released entirely from their obligations to repay debts.
For Mann the moral economy of debt and the legal treatment of debtors that was an
expression of it were part and parcel of a traditional society and economy in which production for the market and economic specialization were still quite limited and in which most
internal trade was highly localized, limited to neighbors in the same or nearby towns. The
driving force for change in eighteenth-century America came from the growing role that
commerce began to play in American life. More products were exchanged over longer
distances, increasingly now between strangers brought together by faceless markets that
were governed less and less by traditional morality. Mann views the economic boom
followed by the economic bust brought on by the Seven Years’ War as a crucial turning
point in American attitudes towards and legal treatment of debtors. “War made everyone
familiar with risk, economic risk included” (p. 55). Despite their best intentions and best
efforts, numerous people found themselves in economic difficulty. It became increasingly
apparent that economic failure was often the result of market forces rather than a consequence of moral improvidence.
“The legal landscape changed dramatically after about 1755, coincident with the Seven
Years’ War” (p. 53). A number of colonies, New York, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts
among them, enacted true bankruptcy legislation that allowed debtors to escape their debts
entirely under specified conditions. These legal developments reflected fundamental
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changes in attitudes. In the 1750s, Mann shows, Americans first began to produce a pamphlet literature that both criticized the practice of imprisonment for debt and advocated
bankruptcy relief. Throughout the period from the 1750s to the Revolution, however, debt
relief by the individual colonies remained a patchwork of provisions often enacted temporarily, frequently amended, and almost as often subsequently repealed.
After the Revolution the story of debt relief became entwined with the story of the
adoption of the Constitution and the establishment of a Federal Government. During the
difficult times of the 1780s, a number of state legislatures took steps to try to limit the
economic impact on their ordinary citizens by adopting paper currency, and passing a
variety of debtor relief measures such as stay laws (which delayed collection of debts) and
legal tender laws (which compelled creditors to accept repayment of debts in often depreciated paper currency). A group of Revolutionary leaders came to believe that in creating a
stronger central government, the power of the states to interfere with creditor rights had to
be restricted. Not only did the new Constitution authorize the Federal Government to
regulate commerce, it also prohibited the states from “mak[ing] any thing but gold and
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; . . . [or] pass[ing] any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . .” (U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 10). The clause that gave the
Federal Government authority to pass uniform bankruptcy laws was added to the Constitution with little controversy or discussion, according to Mann.
Although he does not say so, the easy adoption of the bankruptcy clause poses a problem.
Why was the grant of power to the Federal Government to discharge debtors entirely from
their contractual obligations not more controversial? Mann says that the bankruptcy clause
was seen merely as an adjunct to the power to regulate commerce and this is undoubtedly
true. But it is only part of the answer. The rest of the answer is to be found in the debates that
took place throughout the 1790s as bankruptcy bill after bankruptcy bill was introduced and
failed to be enacted by Congress. Finally in 1800 the Federalists, still in control of Congress
and the Presidency, managed to pass the first Federal Bankruptcy Law. Like the English
bankruptcy acts, the American law limited bankruptcy relief to commercial traders who owed
very large sums of money. Farmers and other small debtors did not qualify. Although they
had shown great solicitude for creditor rights so far as popularly elected state legislatures were
concerned, proponents of the new federal government had also shown great solicitude for
commerce and the moneyed interest. In commerce where creditors were also, and frequently
simultaneously, debtors, the system might operate more smoothly and efficiently under a law
that discharged debts so long as it was enacted by a responsible political body such as the
Federal Congress and discharged only the right kind of debtor.
This is a beautifully written book about an important subject, but it suffers from a serious
weakness. The larger explanatory framework (from moral economy to market society) does
not always account well for many of the details of the story. Put another way, many of the
details raise questions for which the larger explanatory framework simply does not offer
answers. If discharge of debts was unthinkable early in the eighteenth century, how could
Massachusetts and New Hampshire ever have passed bankruptcy acts (even temporary
ones) in 1714 and 1715? (pp. 52–53). Decades before the 1750s a number of colonies
showed surprising solicitude for debtors by enacting insolvency legislation. Although this
legislation did not formally discharge debts it did discharge some debtors from imprisonment for those debts, making ultimate repayment of the debts seemingly much less likely.
How does this apparent solicitude for some debtors square with the morally suspect character of debt and debtors in the early eighteenth century? Moreover, a number of these insolvency acts provided for the release of the wrong kind of debtor, it would seem, poor debtors and debtors who only owed relatively small sums of money. Larger debtors often did
not qualify for release under these insolvency acts. Just the opposite held true of the Bank-
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ruptcy Act of 1800. What are we to make of these differences? And what are we to make,
for example, of a legal tender law enacted in Massachusetts as early as 1712 and titled “An
Act To Prevent the Oppression of Debtors”? (The Acts and Resolves Public and Private
of the Province of Massachusetts Bay. Boston: Wright & Potter, 1869: Vol. 1, pp. 700–01).
Might an older political and economic conflict between farmers and other small debtors on
the one hand and commercial interests on the other running all the way back through the
eighteenth century help to explain some of this evidence? Although Mann’s book has
brought together a great deal of material and fashioned it into a large narrative, one comes
away with a sense that a good deal more of the political and economic context of debt in
the eighteenth century remains to be explored.
ROBERT J. STEINFELD, State University of New York at Buffalo

